A decision maker (DM) prefers to allocate a limited number of prizes to the "highest-quality" agents. Although the DM is initially uniformed about quality, she can learn about quality through a review process before awarding prizes. Due to time constraints, however, the DM is unable to review all agents before making a decision. The method by which the DM allocates her limited attention affects her ability to learn about and implement her optimal prize allocation. We introduce a novel mechanism by which the DM may allocate her attention: "Contests for Attention."
Introduction
Politicians and bureaucrats want to fund projects and implement policies that offer the greatest benefit to constituents. Similarly, legislators may want to earmark government contracts to the most-qualified suppliers. To learn about the benefits of different policies and projects, the decision maker can meet with lobbyists, hold legislative hearings, and otherwise investigate different options before implementing policy or assigning earmarks. In other settings, potential employers can learn about job applicant qualifications by conducting interviews and calling references before choosing whom to hire. A woman can learn about the quality of potential suitors by dating before, let's say, getting married. Similar review processes help college admissions officers award merit scholarships to the most worthy recipients, procurement officers choose the most-qualified suppliers, and grant writing organizations allocate funding to the most-promising research projects.
In each of these situations, agents are privately informed about their "quality," and a decision maker can research the quality of different agents before choosing how to allocate a limited number of "prizes" (e.g., earmarks, policy reforms, jobs, scholarships) to the agents. If the decision maker reviews the quality of all agents, then she can identify and implement her fully-informed, ideal prize allocation. Due to time constraints or costs of review, however, the decision maker is unable to review all agents before choosing an allocation. For example, politician's rarely meet with all interest groups, instead only granting access to those who pay large-enough political contributions.
Employers rarely interview all job applicants, rather selecting a subset of applicants to interview.
A woman may not date every potential suitor, only dating the ones that make the biggest fool out of themselves at the bar in an effort to win her attention.
The decision maker first decides which agents to review, then after conducting reviews chooses the prize allocation that maximizes her expected utility. The way in which the decision maker decides which agents to review affects her ability to learn agent quality. For example, the decision maker could randomly review agents, or select agents to review based on some observable characteristic. Alternatively, the decision maker could require that agents make a fixed payment in order to be reviewed, e.g., charge an application fee. Section 3.3 reviews these methods of choosing which agents to review and shows that each results in the decision maker being less-than-fully informed about her ideal prize allocation. 1 This paper focuses on a novel method for awarding attention: through a contest.
Our first contribution is to illustrate how competition between agents for the decision maker's attention results in a better-informed decision maker and more-qualified prize recipients. In our framework, the decision maker determines which agents to review through a "Contest for Attention" 1 Assigning reviews based on an observable characteristic (e.g., expected agent quality) leaves the decision maker completely uniformed about the quality of those not reviewed. Reviewing only those who pay an application fee can result in only agents with high-enough quality (i.e., a high-enough expected allocation if the decision maker learns their quality) willing to pay the fee (see for example, Austen-Smith 1998, Leslie 2005 , Cotton 2010 ). Compared to randomly reviewing agents, the use of fees makes the decision maker more-informed about the quality of the agents who do not receive access. Although some uncertainty remains about the quality of those without access and the ideal allocation.
in which agents make costly payments (e.g., money, time, effort) in competition for a limited number of review slots. In such a contest, high-quality agents are willing to pay more than lower-quality agents in an effort to inform the decision maker of their type. In equilibrium, each agent's payment is strictly increasing in its quality. The decision maker (correctly) expects that agents that make high payments are higher quality than similar agents who make lower payments, and in equilibrium the decision maker fully infers agent quality from their payments. That is, the decision maker becomes fully informed about the quality of all agents, even though she can only review some of them.
Our second theoretical contribution is to derive the revenue-maximizing, full-information contest for attention. Out of all possible methods for awarding limited attention and choosing a prize allocation, we identify a mechanism for doing so that (1) guarantees that the prizes are allocated as if the decision maker perfectly observes the quality of all agents, and (2) maximizes total payments conditional on implementing the first-best allocation. The payment-maximizing, full-information contest for attention is the preferred method for reviewing applications and awarding prizes by any decision maker who has lexicographic preferences in favor of choosing the best-possible allocation, and secondary preferences for maximizing payments.
When agents differ only in their quality, the payment-maximizing, full-information contest for attention takes the form of a standard all-pay auction, where the decision maker reviews the agents whom provide the highest payment. When there are observable differences between the agents which affect their willingness to pay, awarding attention through a standard all-pay auction results in a fully-informed decision maker, but does not maximize payments. The payment-maximizing, fullinformation contest for attention requires that the all-pay contest handicap payments to account for agent asymmetries. (Think of a head-start in a footrace or a golf handicap, which allow contestants of different types to compete on more-equal terms. In a political setting, this means that a poor interest group needs to pay less for a politician's attention than an otherwise similar rich interest group.) The payment-maximizing, full-information contest for attention completely handicaps for known asymmetries such that the highest-quality agents are always reviewed in equilibrium.
The analysis begins with the case where the decision maker awards a single prize. We consider both the situation when agents only differ in terms of their qualifications in Section 4, as well as the situation with observable agent heterogeneity in Section 5. Section 6 extends the analysis to the case with multiple prizes.
Section 7 shows that a decision maker may be made worse off by reviewing additional agents. This is because a contest for attention results in a fully-informed decision maker only if the decision maker does not review more agents than there are prizes. Contrary to intuition, this means that the decision maker may be more informed about agent qualifications if she reviews only a single agent, compared to reviewing almost all of the agents. The section also discusses alternative frameworks and assumptions about the decision maker's preferences.
Section 8 discusses policy implications of our results. We first consider the impact of campaign finance reform in a political setting where agents provide campaign contributions in competition for access to a politician. In our framework, a contribution limit reduces the politician's ability to extract political rent from interest groups. Under a limit, the politician adjusts her method of awarding attention to account for lower maximum payments, and can still become fully informed.
Therefore, limits do not reduce the politician's ability to identify and implement her preferred policy.
Finally, we discuss the fact that politicians are often time constrained and unable to fully review each piece of legislation before casting a vote. Common intuition suggests that these constraints must result in worse policy choices. We show that the opposite may actually be true. When access to a politician is limited, the competition between interest groups for attention may result in a more-informed politician and better policy choices.
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Competing for consideration
At the heart of our analysis is the contest for attention, a handicapped all-pay contest used by the decision maker to determine which agents she reviews. This framework differs from the majority of the contest literature, where contests are used to directly allocate prizes. The two articles mostclosely related to our analysis, Fullerton and McAfee (1999) and Cotton (2009) , deviate from the majority of the literature and use contests at early stages of a game to elicit information about player types.
The contest for attention in our paper plays a similar role as the participant-selection contest in Fullerton and McAfee (1999) . In their paper, a contest designer must select a subset of agents to participate in a research tournament. Fullerton and McAfee show that using a contest to allocate entry into the research tournament ensures that only the highest-ability agents enter the tournament. In our setting and in Fullerton-McAfee, higher-qualification agents are willing to pay more to "participate" in the next stage of the game, whether the next stage is our paper's review process or Fullerton and McAfee's research tournament. Cotton (2009) develops a stylized model of competitive lobbying between two interest groups, where a politician decides whether to sell policy favors or political access. Where selling favors maximizes revenue, selling access resulted in better policy. Although the mechanism by which the politician sells access is a special case of the contest mechanisms explored in the present paper, the stylized model in the earlier paper focused on the tradeoff between selling policy and selling access, not on the full revelation of information. The present paper focuses on the full revelation of information in a more-general framework in which we allow for numerous agents, multiple prizes, and applicant asymmetries. Our analysis formalizes the full-information result that was first proposed for the stylized lobbying model in Cotton (2009) . Our generalized model may represent a variety of strategic interactions, both in politics and elsewhere.
All pay contests
In the literature, all-pay auctions are typically used to directly allocate prizes (e.g., Siegel 2009 , Baye et al. 1993 , Hillman and Riley 1989 . In our framework the all-pay auction is used to allocate the decision maker's attention.
When we allow for observable agent asymmetries, the decision maker's preferred method of awarding the prizes involves a handicapped all-pay auction mechanism. Such a mechanism fully adjusts agent payments to account for known heterogeneity. There exists a growing literature on handicapping contests. Siegel (2010) develops a general all-pay contest framework with handicaps in an environment with complete information. See also Feess et al. (2008) . Kirkegaard (2010) considers the use of handicaps in a model with private information about valuations. Eso and Szentes (2007) show that a version of a handicap auction can maximize revenue in a game in which the auctioneer chooses how much information to reveal to the bidders about the value of the good. 2 The present paper assumes that bidders reveal information to the auctioneer (not the other way around), and the auctioneer's goal is to collect as much information as possible (rather than revenue maximization). We show how a handicap auction can also be used to maximize the revelation of information, not only revenue. In none of these other models is a handicapped contest used to elicit information about bidder types.
Limited attention and political access
Our results provide an example of how political contributions may play a positive role in the political process, and is largely in contrast to models of influence in which politicians sell policies rather than access (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1994, Coate 2004a) . 3 The general framework, in which a decision maker awards attention in exchange for payments, is consistent with the evidence that political contribution influence an interest group's ability to gain access to politicians. See for example the empirical analyses by Langbein (1986) , Ansolabehere et al. (2002) , and Hall and Wayman (1990) , as well as surveys by Herndon (1982) and Makinson (2003) .
To our knowledge, only two other papers, Cotton (2009 Cotton ( , 2010 , require one to gain access before directly revealing their type to a politician. Additionally, Austen-Smith (1998) requires one to gain access before conducting publicly observable experiments hat may reveal information about the true state of the world. Cotton (2009) is discussed above. Both Cotton (2010) and Austen-Smith (1998) assume that a decision maker sets a price for access, then awards an agent access if the 2 Others also consider games in which an auctioneer can affect bidder information (e.g., Bergemann and Pesendorfer 2007) .
3 See also the policy-for-sale models by Grossman and Helpman (1996) , and Prat (2002a,b) . In such policy-for-sale models, politicians typically know which course of auction is best for their constituents, but choose to do something else in order to attract political contributions. Others including Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006) and Dahm and Porteiro (2008a,b) allow interest groups to influence policy through both the disclosure of evidence and the explicit exchange of contributions for favors. These papers do not consider limited access, and contributions are only provided in exchange for favors. We are not the first to suggest that political contributions may play a beneficial role. In Coate (2004b) , for example, contributions fund informative advertising, which improves voter ability to choose the most qualified candidate. agent pays the announced price. Although such a method for awarding access may increase the decision maker's information (i.e., he knows that any agent that doesn't pay for access must have low-enough quality evidence), it is not a full revelation mechanism as the decision maker remains less than fully informed about the qualifications of agents that do not buy access. 4
Costly verification and auditing
When the decision maker reviews an agent (e.g., holds an interview, calls references, or otherwise conducts an investigation), the agent's quality is fully revealed. This process is related to the literature on costly information verification and auditing. Various articles show how carefully selected auditing policy can increase payoffs in a variety of situations (e.g., Townsend 1979 , Baron and Besanko 1984 , Border and Sobel 1987 , Mookherjee and Png 1989 , Kofman and Lawarree 1993 , Khalil and Lawarree 2001 . We identify a novel mechanism for deciding which agents to auditthrough a contest-and show how the mechanism allows the decision maker to learn about the types of all agents, even when she only audits some of them. 5
Preliminaries
Model
A decision maker (DM) wants to award a prize to the "highest-quality" or "most-qualified" agent.
However, she is ex ante uncertain about agent quality. There are n potential recipients, where i denotes an arbitrary agent in N = {1, ..., n}. Each agent's qualifications, q i , is an independent realization of a random variable with continuous support Q = (0, q max ), smooth distribution F , and density f . 6 Agents privately observe their own q i . The distributions are common knowledge.
If the DM knows q = {q 1 , ..., q n }, then she can identify and award the prize to the most-qualified agent. However, the DM is ex ante uncertain about q. Before choosing a prize allocation, the DM can review agent quality. If she reviews i, then she perfectly observes q i . Due to time constraints, however, the DM is unable to review all agents. Formally, she may review up tok agents, wherē k ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}. Let a i ∈ {0, 1} indicate whether the DM reviews (e.g., gives "attention" to) agent i. Define ω ≡ (a 1 q 1 , ..., a n q n ), the vector of qualities observed through the review process.
Agents may simultaneously provide payments (e.g., money, time, effort) to the DM before she chooses which agents to review. Let c i ≥ 0 denote any payment made by agent i, where c = (c 1 , ..., c n ). The DM's review decision may depend on c. 4 Levy and Razin (2009) consider a game in which interest groups compete to put items on a politician's agenda. Although their model does not include verifiable information disclosure, it does incorporate a similar notion of access as our paper.
5 Although we assume that the decision maker is limited in the number of reviews she can conduct, making it costly for the decision maker to conduct each review would produce similar results. As long as the decision maker cares enough about prize-winner qualifications, relative to the cost of reviewing applications, he will prefer the mechanism for granting access and awarding prizes described here to any other mechanism.
6 Two distributions that we use in examples throughout the analysis include Q = (0, 1) and Q = (0, ∞).
The analysis is primarily concerned with whether the DM can allocate attention in such a way that she becomes fully informed about agent quality. We assume preferences that are consistent with this objective: the DM's preferences are lexicographic in prize-recipient quality. Then, conditional on maximizing prize winner quality, she also benefits from higher payments from the agents. The main result-that a contest for attention results in a fully-informed DM-does not depend on the DM benefiting from payments. 7 Assuming that the DM has secondary preferences in favor of collecting payments provides a dimension by which to compare different full-information mechanisms for deciding which agents to review.
Agents benefit from receiving the prize, and find payments costly. Let p i ∈ {0, 1} indicate whether the DM allocates the prize to agent i. Agent i earns utilityû i (p i , c i ) = p ivi − c iτi , wherê v i > 0 andτ i > 0 denote the relative values the agent puts on winning the prize and the costs of payments. Any positive affine transformation ofû i maintains preferences. We therefore define v i ≡v i /τ i and u i ≡û i /τ , and rewrite agent i's preferences as
An agent's payoff does not directly depend on its qualifications, q i . In this sense, the agents are advocates for their respective positions (e.g., Dewatripont and Tirole 1999) . The functions u i , including the value of v i , are common knowledge. Most auction models assume that valuations or costs are unknown. We make the alternative assumption that v i is known, but that agents have private information about their qualifications. This is consistent with situations in which prospective employees vie for a job with a known wage, or potential suppliers vie for a procurement contract with an announced budget. It also describes situations in which a politician knows how well financed interest groups are, but does not know how different policies will benefit her constituents.
We rank order the agents according to their value, such that
Denote the DM's updated beliefs about q by µ, where µ i (q i ) is the probability the DM puts on agent i having qualifications q i . 8
Decision maker as mechanism designer
We approach the problem as a mechanism design problem in which the DM chooses an "attentionprize mechanism"M = {A; P }. Attention rule A = {A 1 , ..., A n } determines which agents receive attention given payments c, where A i (c) is the probability the DM reviews i. Prize rule P = {P 1 , ..., P n } determines which agent is allocated the prize given payments c and revealed qualifications ω, where P i (c, ω) is the probability i receives the prize.
7 In models of political influence, it is likely that the DM benefits from agent payments (e.g., political contributions). In other settings, this assumption may be less realistic. For example, when job seekers or college applicants put in effort to gain the attention of potential employers or admissions officers, for example.
8 Formally, function µ(· | c, ω) defines the DM's beliefs about the state of the world given payments c and revealed qualifications ω. These updated beliefs may be fully represented by a vector of updated density functions,
The game takes place as follows. First, the DM announcesM = {A; P }. Second, knowingM , the agents make payments c. Then, A determines which agents receive attention, and P determines which one receives the prize. 9
Allowing the DM to commit to the attention-prize mechanism in the beginning of the game does not result in any time inconsistency problems. Importantly, the DM's optimal choice of A and P always awards the prize in a sequentially rational way at the end of the game. That is, she always prefers a prize allocation rule that in equilibrium awards the prize to the agent she believes is most-qualified. Her choice of which agents to review will also be sequentially rational given that the DM is time constrained, but otherwise does not find reviewing agents costly. 10
After the DM announcesM , the agents simultaneously submit payments in the game defined byM . Let function C i denote a payment strategy for agent i, where C i (q i ) is i's payment when he has quality q i . Their payments must be consistent with the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium under mechanismM .
Standard methods for awarding attention
Attention rule A affects the accuracy of the DM's beliefs about agents whom do not receive attention. This means that the method for awarding attention affects her ability to awards the prize to the most-qualified agent. Below we review traditional methods for awarding attention. None of the standard methods for allocating attention guarantee that the most-qualified agent receive the prize in equilibrium. Section 3.4 introduces a method of allocating the DM's limited attention which guarantees that the most-qualified agents win attention in equilibrium: contests for attention.
Random attention. Suppose that the DM randomly chooses which receive attention. That is, A i (c) = 1 n for all i and any c. In this case, the DM has correct beliefs about the qualifications of all agents she reviews, but learns nothing about the qualifications of agents she does not review.
Because she cannot review all agents, the DM will never be certain that she allocates the prize to the most-qualified agent.
Attention based on known characteristic. The logic from the random-attention case carries over for the case when the DM awards attention based on some observable agent characteristic (e.g., value or expected q i ). Here again, A i (c) is independent of c. The DM perfectly observes the qualifications of the agents with attention, and learns nothing about the qualifications of the other agents.
Application fees. Others have shown how charging application fees (e.g., submission fees, access fees) can discourage low-quality applicants, which allows the DM to concentrate review efforts on the most-promising agents (e.g., Austen-Smith 1998, Cotton 2010). In our setting, an 9 By allowing the DM to announceM at the beginning of the game, we eliminate the issues of multiple equilibria that arises when agents submit payments before the DM decides how payments affect the probability of agents receiving attention or prizes.
10 Alternatively, if the DM pays a cost per review, then the contest for attention mechanisms that the analysis focuses on requires that the DM can commit ex ante to review one or more agents. Without the ability to commit (when reviews are costly), the DM may have an incentive to renege on any promise to review agents. Reputation concerns may be sufficient justification for this. application fee has a similar effect, making the DM better informed, potentially increasing the probability that the most-qualified agent receives the prize. However, such fees cannot guarantee that the best agent receives the prize.
In the equilibrium of such application fee game, each agent i employees a cut-rule strategy, q i , paying the fee when q i ≥q i , and not paying the fee when q i <q i . When the fee is too high, q i = 1 for all i, and no agent ever pays for access. In that case, the DM learns nothing about qualifications before awarding the prize. On the other hand, when the price is sufficiently low, q i = 0 for all i, and all agents pay for access. In that case, the DM randomly chooses a subset of the agents to review, and remains uninformed about the other agents. For intermediate fees, agents pay the fee only if they have high-enough qualifications, i.e.,q i ∈ (0, 1). Intermediate fees prevent low-qualification agents from entering the review process, and allows the DM to focus her attention on agents that are more qualified. Given the uncertainty about agent qualifications, however, two situations happen, each with positive probability, which result in uncertainty about the identity of the highest-quality agent. First, it is possible that all agents draw too low of quality to submit payments, in which case the DM remains fully uninformed about agent quality when awarding the prize. Second, it is possible that more thank agents draw high-enough qualifications to submit payments, in which case the DM remains uncertain about the relative quality of agents who submit payments but do not receive attention. Setting fees makes the DM better informed about relative agent quality, but does not eliminate the possibility that the DM awards the prize to someone besides the highest-quality agent in equilibrium. 11
Contests for Attention
The primary contribution of our paper is to identify a method for awarding attention that (i) enables the DM to learn about the qualifications of all agents, and (ii) guarantees that the mostqualified agent receives the prize in equilibrium. This method involves agents providing payments (e.g., time, money, effort) in competition with one another for the DM's limited attention. When the DM relies on a contest to decide which agents to review, she becomes fully informed about the qualifications of all agents, even though she can only review some agents.
The intuition is as follows. When the DM allocates attention through a contest, agent i's willingness to pay in effort to get the DM's attention is increasing in q i . All else equal, morequalified agents pay more in competition for attention compared to less-qualified agents. The DM recognizes that higher payments correspond to higher qualifications, and even when she does not review agent i, she makes inferences about qualifications q i after observing its payment c i . In equilibrium, these inferences are correct. The DM has correct beliefs about the qualifications of all agents, even though she reviews only some of them directly.
Contest Mechanism
We can fully describe an all-pay contest by the number of prizes available, and a "score" function for each agent. When the agents compete for the DM's attention, the number of prizes is given by the number of agents the DM reviews, k ∈ {1, ...,k}, before allocating the prize. The vector of contest score functions is given by θ = (θ 1 , ..., θ n ). For each agent, θ i (c i ) assigns a score to agent i given payment c i , where θ i (0) = 0 and θ i (c i ) > 0 for all c i . The DM reviews the k agents with the highest scores. Ties are broken with equal probability of attention assigned to each tied agent.
In the most-straightforward situation, the contest for attention takes the form of a standard all-pay auction in which agents make payments (e.g., time, money, effort), and the k agents who submit the highest payments win attention. This is the case when θ i (c i ) = c i for each i.
A general function θ i allows the attention rule to take into account individual agent characteristics, including differences in v i and F i . That is, the model allows for the handicapping of bid functions in the all-pay auctions. 12
The simple, non-handicapped version of the contest mechanism is the focus of Section 4, where we show how awarding attention to the highest bidders results in a fully-informed DM implementing the first-best prize allocation. Section 5 considers a version of the contest which handicaps score functions to account for known differences between the agents. We show that such a variation of the contest maximizes payments from agents to the DM, while still guaranteeing that the highestquality agent receives the prize.
Contest components k and θ fully define A, the attention rule component of attention-prize mechanismM = {A; P }. 13 We substitute them intoM for A, and refer to the resulting M = {k, θ; P } as a "Contest Mechanism," where k and θ describe the contest, and P describes the prize rule. Any contest mechanism M is a special case of attention-prize mechanismM .
Contest equilibrium
For much of the analysis, we take the contest mechanism as given and focus on the equilibrium strategies of the agents within the contest. The contest for attention game is a Bayesian game in which agents simultaneously make payments, and the payments determine which agents are reviewed by the DM. Agents know the rules of the game and their own quality, but are uncertain about the quality of the other agents.
The analysis solves for the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the contest for attention, which we refer to as the "Contest Equilibrium." The set of equilibrium payment strategies C * = {C * 1 , ..., C * n } constitutes a contest equilibrium if no i has an incentive to deviate from c i = C * i (q i ) for any realization of q i given the contest mechanism and the strategies of the other agents.
The Contest Equilibrium strategies, when combined with the DM's strategies and beliefs when choosing a mechanism and implementing policy, constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the 12 See for example Feess et al. (2008) and Siegel (2010) . 13 Ai(c) = 1 when fewer than k other agents have scores at least as large as θi(ci). Ai(c) = 0 when more than k others have higher scores. Ai(c) = 1/#(j ∈ N | θj(cj) = θi(ci)) when agent i is tied for the kth highest score. overall game.
Strictly increasing payment functions
In the contest equilibria which we describe in the following sections, equilibrium payment functions C * i are strictly increasing in agent qualifications. It is helpful to understand the implications of strict monotonicity before proceeding with the analysis.
Strictly increasing payment functions mean a fully separating equilibrium, where there is a unique relationship between an agent's qualifications and payment. In equilibrium, when the DM observes payment c i , she believes that i must have qualifications
the inverse of i's equilibrium payment function C * i . In equilibrium, the DM correctly infers agent quality by observing payments, and in equilibrium her beliefs about q are correct.
Because the DM has correct beliefs about q, she can identify and implement the first-best prize allocation, awarding the prize to the most-qualified agent.
for each i and all q i , then the DM becomes fully informed about the quality of all agents and implements the first-best prize allocation with probability 1.
It is helpful to narrow down the set of feasible strictly-increasing equilibrium payment functions.
In doing so, we first define Ω(q i ) as the ex ante probability that an agent with qualifications q i is the most-qualified agent. Formally, Ω(q i ) = F (q i ) n−1 . Let B i (q i ) denote the expected benefit to player i of participating in a mechanism that guarantees the first-best prize allocation. That is,
Agent i's individual rationality constraint requires that his equilibrium payment, C * i (q i ), not exceed his expected benefit from participating. Therefore, B i also represents the maximum possible payment function for agent i given its qualifications. If the mechanism by which the DM awards the prize guarantees that the prize goes to the most-qualified agent, then
Furthermore, the marginal payment may never exceed the marginal benefit associated with a change in q i . That is,
where
If this inequality does not hold for someq i , then an agent withq i strictly prefers to pay less than C * i (q i ). Notice that the requirement imposed by Eq. 3 implies the requirement imposed by Eq. 2.
Let β i define the set of all feasible strictly-increasing equilibrium payment functions for agent i under a mechanism that guarantees the first best prize allocation. β i includes all functions
That is, agents with the worstpossible qualifications pay 0, and the marginal payment never exceeds the marginal benefit. Since all functions within β i are strictly increasing, the DM necessarily becomes fully informed about q when in equilibrium C * i ∈ β i for all i ∈ N . Let β = {β 1 , ..., β N }. The strict monotonicity of the equilibrium payment functions has implications for the feasible set of prize allocation rules. If the DM expects that agents make payments according to strictly increasing payment strategies, C 1 , ..., C n , then sequential rationality requires that P satisfy
for all i ∈ N . Remember that ω i = r i q i . If a tie were to occur-that is if multiple agents share value
]-then each of the tied agents win the prize with equal probability. Given the continuous distribution from which quality is drawn, however, ties happen with probability 0 in equilibrium. The equilibrium policy rule must satisfy Eq. 4 for C i = C * i and all i.
Symmetric Contest Mechanisms
The analysis begins with the case where the contest mechanism is not biased in favor of any agents.
Here, the attention is given to the agent who submits the highest payments, and the same prize rule P is applied to all agents to determine the recipient of the prize.
The contest rule takes the form of a symmetric all-pay contest in which k = 1 and θ i (c i ) = c i for all i. Setting k = 1 involves the least amount of attention by the DM. It remains a feasible choice for anyk. We consider alternative choices of k in Section ??. In the symmetric contest mechanism, the prize rule P must also give the same treatment to all agents. This means that the prize rule
Denote this symmetric payment function byC.C must be feasible for all agents, including the agent with the lowest value and most restrictive set of equilibrium payment functions. Thus, it must be thatC ∈ β n .
Let M s (C) denote the symmetric contest mechanism that awards attention to 1 agents before awarding the prize, and treats all agents as if they contribute according to strictly increasing payment functionC. Thus, M s (C) denotes mechanism M = {k, θ; P (c, ω;C)} where k = 1, θ i (c i ) = c i , and P i is given by Eq. 4 evaluated at C i =C for each i ∈ N .
Lemma 4.1 shows that if the DM awards attention and the prize according to M s (C), then the agents will contribute according toC in equilibrium.
Lemma 4.1 For anyC ∈ β n ,
• C * i =C for all i ∈ N is a contest equilibrium of contest mechanism M s (C), and
• C * i =C for all i ∈ N and the strategies implied by M s (C) comprise a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the overall game.
The lemma shows that if the DM chooses policy as if all agents contribute according to function C, then in equilibrium all agents prefer to contribute according toC. In such an equilibrium, the most qualified agent wins attention, and receives the prize. An agent can increase its payment in an effort to signal higher qualifications than it actually has, but this increases the DM's expectations about its qualifications only if it does not win attention-in which case amore-qualified agent wins attention, and then receives the prize. Similarly, an agent can decrease its payment, but it never prefers to do so sinceC ∈ β i for all i ∈ N . When all other agents contribute according toC, and the DM expects that agent i also contributes according toC, then agent i prefers to contributē C(q i ).
Lemma 4.2 establishes that the equilibria described in Lemma 4.1 are the only symmetric equilibria which result in a fully-informed DM, and guarantees the first best prize allocation.
Lemma 4.2 If and only ifC ∈ β n does the symmetric contest equilibrium of M s (C) results in a fully informed DM and the first best prize allocation with probability 1.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward, following directly from the definition of β i in Section 3.4.3 and Lemma 4.1. β i is the set of feasible payment functions for agent i in a full-information equilibrium. IfC / ∈ β n , then it is not a feasible equilibrium payment function for at least one agent. IfC ∈ β n , then it is a feasible payment function for all agents, since
Payment Maximizing Symmetric Contest
If it were not for the DM's ability to announce a prize allocation rule prior to the contest, the multiplicity of contest equilibria could present a coordination problem. As it is, the DM selects P up front as part of the contest mechanism, and by doing so she guarantees that the unique equilibrium of the contest for attention corresponds to her preferredC ∈ β n .
Given that all of the symmetric contest mechanisms in Lemma 4.2 result in the first-best prize allocation, the DM prefers the contest mechanism that maximizes payments from the agents.
Lemma 4.3 characterizes this payment-maximizing contest mechanism.
Before presenting the proposition, we define M * s ≡ M s (B n ). That is M * s is the symmetric contest mechanism M s (C) givenC = B n . Function B i is given by Eq. 1 and represents the expected benefit-and therefore the maximum feasible payment-for agent i in a full-information equilibrium.
B n is the maximum feasible payment function for the agent with the lowest willingness to pay. It follows that out of all symmetric contest mechanisms, M * s results in the highest payments from the agents to the DM. Out of all symmetric contest mechanisms, the DM strictly prefers mechanism M * s . Awarding attention and the prize accordingly guarantees that the most qualified agent receives the prize, and, compared to other symmetric contest mechanisms, maximizes payments from the agents to the DM. Under mechanism M * s ≡ M s (B n ), the DM awards attention to the agent that makes the highest payment, then updates her beliefs about other agent qualifications under the assumption that they made their payments according to B n (q i ) = F (q i ) n−1 v n . Then, in equilibrium as they compete for the DM's attention, each agent makes a payment according to C * i (q i ) = B n (q i ). Since the symmetric payment function is strictly increasing in q i , the DM is able to correctly infer each agent's qualifications from its payment. The fully-informed DM is able to implement the first-best prize allocation. Although other symmetric contest mechanisms also result in the first-best prize allocation, this version of the symmetric mechanism is chosen by the DM because it guarantees the first-best prize allocation while maximizing payments from the agents.
Agent payoffs
Lemma 4.4 shows that symmetric contest mechanism M * s allows the DM to extract all rent from the lowest-value agents. Higher value agents, however, expect positive utility from participating in the contest for attention. 
Optimality of the symmetric contest
Lemma 4.3 shows that symmetric contest mechanism M * s is preferred by the DM to all other symmetric contest mechanisms. It does not rule out the possibility that the DM prefers an asymmetric contest mechanism, or any other method of awarding the prize.
Here, we show that if agents differ only in their qualifications, then M * s is preferred to all other methods of awarding the prize. Section 5 derives the optimal method of awarding the prize for the more-general chase where there are observable differences between the agents. Proposition 4.5 If v i = v j for all i, j ∈ N , then symmetric contest mechanism M * s (i) guarantees that the most-qualified agent receives the prize, and (ii) achieves the highest possible payment from each agent. The DM prefers M * s to any other method of awarding the prize.
Proposition 4.5 compares the DM's payoffs under mechanism M * s to her payoffs under all other mechanisms by which she may award the prize. The comparison is not limited to contests, or the alternative methods considered in Section 3.3. Rather the proposition establishes that the DM is at least as well off awarding the prize according to attention-prize mechanism M * s compared to any other possible method by which she can award the prize.
The DM has lexicographic preferences in favor of maximizing prize-recipient qualifications, and secondary preferences for collecting payments from agents. Given this, the DM's optimal mechanism for awarding the prize must guarantee that the most-qualified agent receives the prize.
Then, conditional on achieving the first best prize allocation, the DM prefers the mechanism that maximizes payments. As Section 3.4.3 established, agent i will never be willing to pay more than B(q i ) = F (q i ) n−1 v i under a mechanism that guarantees the first best prize allocation. This is its expected benefit from participating in such a mechanism. Therefore, the DM achieves the highestpossible payoffs under a mechanism that guarantees the first best prize allocation, and under which each agent pays C * i (q i ) = F (q i ) n−1 v i . When agents only differ in their qualifications, v i = v j for all i, j ∈ N . This means that B i = B n , and under M * s , C * i = B i for all i. That is, in the contest equilibrium under M * s , all agents submit the maximum possible payment they would ever submit under a mechanism that guarantees the most-qualified agent receives a prize. In this case, M * s achieves the highest possible payoff for the DM.
When agents differ in their valuations as well as their qualifications, the symmetric contest mechanism does not achieve the highest possible payments from any agent with v i = v n .
Asymmetric Contest Mechanisms
The previous section considers a symmetric contest mechanism in which the DM awards attention to the agent who submits the highest payment. When agents only differ in their qualifications, such a mechanism for awarding attention and the prize can maximize DM payoffs. When there are observable differences between the agents, however, a symmetric contest mechanism can guarantee that the most-qualified agent receives the prize, but cannot achieve the highest-possible payments from agents.
In this section, we present a handicapped contest for attention which guarantees both the first best prize allocation and maximum payments. A handicapped contest requires that agents with higher values need to submit higher payments for the same expected probability of receiving attention compared with a lower-value agent.
Let M * a define the asymmetric contest mechanism in which k = 1, and for each i ∈ N , θ i (c i ) = B −1 i (c i ) and P i is given by Eq. 4 given C i = B i . That is, the contest rule of M * a awards attention to the agent who's payment corresponds to the highest qualifications if each agent contributes according his maximum feasible payment function, B i . The prize component of M * a chooses the sequentially rational prize allocation when agents who do not receive attention contribute according to their respective B i .
Lemma 5.1 shows that under mechanism M * a there is a unique contest equilibrium in which all agents make payments according to their maximum feasible payment function, B i . Therefore, the policy rule in M * a is sequentially rational in equilibrium.
Lemma 5.1 If the DM awards attention and prize according to contest mechanism M * a , then
is a contest equilibrium of mechanism M * a , and
• C * i (q i ) = B i (q i ) for all i ∈ N and the strategies implied by M * a comprise a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the overall game.
In the contest equilibrium under M * a , agents each make payments according to strictly increasing payment functions. Lemma 3.1 shows that this strict monotonicity guarantees that the mostqualified agent receives the prize. Additionally, with C * i = B i , each agent's payment is maximized. This is in contrast to the contribution equilibrium under the DM-preferred symmetric contest, M * s , where only the payment from the lowest-value agent was maximized. When the contest mechanism fully handicaps for observed agent asymmetries, the DM is able to fully extract the rent from all agents.
Lemma 5.2 Under asymmetric contest mechanism M * a ,
This means that in equilibrium, each agent's payment equals its expected benefit from participating in a mechanism that guarantees the first best prize allocation. When the DM must award the prize to the most-qualified agent in equilibrium, it is not possible to extract larger payments from the agents than are collected under M * a . It follows that asymmetric contest mechanism M * a always results in the first best payoffs for the DM.
Proposition 5.3 Asymmetric contest mechanism M * a always (i) guarantees that the most-qualified agent receives the prize, and (ii) achieves the highest possible payment from each agent. The DM prefers M * a to any other method of awarding the prize.
It is impossible for the DM to award the prize in such a way that she is made better off compared to M * a , the asymmetric contest mechanism that fully handicaps for differences in agent valuations. In equilibrium under M * a , each agent's payment in competition for attention equals its expected payout when the DM awards the prize to the most-qualified agent. The DM then awards attention to the agent who's payment signals the highest qualifications given their equilibrium payment functions. If an agent wins attention, the DM's review confirms that the agent has qualifications that correspond to its payment, and the agent receives the prize. In equilibrium, the most-qualified agent first wins attention then receives the prize.
Notice that when agents only differ in their qualifications, and v i = v j for all i, j ∈ N , mechanism M * a is equivalent to the symmetric contest mechanism M * s described in Section 4.2. Therefore, Proposition 5.3 is a generalization of Proposition 4.5.
Asymmetric distributions
The model presented in Section 3 allows agents to differ in terms of their value parameter, v i . It is straightforward to allow for other types of heterogeneity, as long as additional asymmetry is observable to all agents and the DM. For example, agents may draw their qualifications from different distributions, where F i denotes the distribution of q i . Assuming that all agents' distributions share a common support, (0, q max ), makes it straightforward to rework the analysis in Section 5 to allow for individual distribution functions.
Only one aspect of the earlier analysis will change. Ω i must be rewritten, such that Ω i = j =i F j (q i ), and B i (q i ) = Ω i v i for each i ∈ N . In the contribution equilibrium C * i = B i given this revised form of Ω i . That is, the mechanism and payment functions must be adapted to account for the individualized distribution functions, but none of the results change.
Multiple Prizes
This section considers the case when the DM must distribute m identical prizes among the n agents.
There are fewer prizes than agents, m ∈ 1, ..., n − 1. Agents can receive at most one prize. With multiple prizes, the DM is primarily concerned about designing a mechanism that maximizes the sum of prize-recipient qualifications, and her secondary objective remains to maximize payments from agents. Otherwise, the model is unchanged from Section 3. The analysis in this section derives the optimal asymmetric mechanism. As before, the symmetric contest mechanism is a special case of the asymmetric contest mechanism.
The analysis precedes as it did in the earlier sections. The maximum feasible payment function under a first best qualification maximizing mechanism is B i (q i ) = Ω m (q i )v i , where Ω m (q i ) is the probability that fewer than m other agents have qualifications greater than q i . That is,
Note that Ω m (q i ) is strictly increasing in q i , and thus B i is strictly increasing and invertible.
Let M * a (k, m) define the asymmetric contest mechanism in which k agents receive attention, m agents receive a prize, and the DM acts as if each agent makes payments according to B i . That is M * a (k, m) is the mechanism M = {k, θ;P } where for each i ∈ N , θ i (c i ) = B −1 i (c i ) (as given by Eq. 1 given Eq. 5) andP i is given by Eq. 6:
When the DM believes agents contribute according to their maximum feasible payment functions, The following results adapt the conclusions from the one-prize analysis to allow for multiple prizes. The conclusions are unchanged.
Lemma 6.1 If the DM awards attention and prize according to any contest mechanism M * a (k, m) such that k ∈ {1, ..., m}, then
• C * i (q i ) = B i (q i ) for all i ∈ N and the strategies implied by M * a (k, m) comprise a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the overall game.
In the contest equilibrium under M * a (k, m), agents each make payments according to strictly increasing payment functions. Lemma 3.1 established that this strict monotonicity guarantees that the most-qualified agent receives the prize. Additionally, with C * i = B i , each agent's payment is maximized. The DM is able to fully extract the rent from all agents.
Lemma 6.2 For any k ∈ {1, ..., m}, under asymmetric contest mechanism M * a (k, m),
This means that in equilibrium, each agent's payment equals its expected benefit from participating. When the DM awards the prize to the most-qualified agent in equilibrium, it is not possible to extract larger payments from the agents than are collected under M * a (k, m). It follows that asymmetric contest mechanism M * a (k, m) always results in the first best payoffs for the DM.
Proposition 6.3 For any k ∈ {1, ..., m}, asymmetric contest mechanism M * a (k, m) always (i) guarantees that the m most-qualified agents receive prizes, and (ii) achieves the highest possible payment from each agent. The DM prefers M * a (k, m) to any other method of awarding the prizes.
It is not possible for the DM to award the prizes in such a way that her expected payoff is higher than under M * a (k, m). This is a generalization of Proposition 5.3 allowing for multiple prizes. The contest mechanism in this case works in a similar way as contest mechanism M * a for the case of one prize. Similarly, when agents only differ in their qualifications, the contest rule in M * a (k, m) simplifies to a symmetric all pay auction in which the m highest bidders win attention.
Feasibility of the Optimal Mechanism
Such a contest mechanism M * a (k, m) is always feasible, even when the DM can review few agents relative to the number of prizes. AS long as the DM can review one agent, she can award her limited attention in such a way that she becomes fully informed about the qualifications of all agent.
Corollary 6.4 For anyk ∈ {1, ..., n − 1} and m ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}, there exists a contest mechanism M * a (k, m) that (i) guarantees the first-best prize allocation, and (ii) achieves the highest possible payment from each agent.
Further Considerations
The Importance of Limiting Attention
We have shown that the DM can always award limited attention in such a way that she becomes fully informed about the qualifications of all agents. The mechanism described in Proposition 6.3 allows for any k ∈ {1, ..., m}. Thus, the DM can become fully informed about agent qualifications even if she can review fewer agents than their are prizes. Suppose, however, that the DM has the ability to review more agents than there are prizes (i.e., ifk > m). Should she choose a k ∈ {m + 1, ...,k}, or should she limit attention to some amount k ≤ m?
The answer to this question goes against popular intuition: by reviewing more agents, the DM becomes less informed about agent qualifications.
To establish this result, we focus on the case in which agents only differ in their qualifications.
For this case, Proposition 6.3 establishes that the for any m ∈ {1, ..., n − 1} and k ∈ {1, .., m}, the DM can award attention according to contest mechanism such that she becomes fully informed about the qualifications of all agents. In this section, we show that when k > m, there does not exist a symmetric contest mechanism that satisfies the conditions in Lemma 3.1 for full qualification revelation.
Proposition 7.1 If k ∈ {m + 1, ..., n − 1}, then there does not exist a sequentially rational contest mechanism M which satisfies the conditions in Lemma 3.1 for full-qualification revelation.
The intuition is as follows. When attention is limited to k ≤ m, in equilibrium the m mostqualified agents must submit one of the m highest payments to receive a prize. This is not true when k > m. If agent i expects that all other agents make payments according to equilibrium payment functionC, then payingC(q i ) guarantees that an agent with qualifications q i wins attention and receives a prize in the event that fewer than m other agents are more qualified. But, this agent also knows that it does not need to submit one of the m highest payments to receive the prize. Rather, it only needs to submit one of the k highest payments, then rely on the review process to establish that it has one of the m highest qualifications. Given that the other agents contribute according toC, any individual agent has an incentive to deviate fromC and submit a marginally lower bid. Doing so saves money, while having essentially no impact on the probability that the agent wins attention (and thus the prize). No such equilibrium can exist.
Noisy quality signals
The model assumes that agents are fully aware of their quality. It is possible, however, that agents do not perfectly aware of how the DM will perceive their quality if she conducts a review. For example, agents may know their experience and characteristics, but not know which characteristics the DM weights most highly when forming beliefs about quality. We may think of such a situation as each agent observing a noisy signal s i about its true quality q i . Higher s i tend to correspond to higher q i . In this setting, the DM may still award attention and prizes through a contest mechanism, in which case agents with higher signals submit higher payments as they compete for the DM's attention. In equilibrium, the DM directly observes the qualifications of any agent she reviews, and can infer the signals of the agents she does not review. The DM is less informed than in the case when agents perfectly observe their true quality. However, she is still more informed than if she awarded the same amount of attention through a different mechanism.
In this alternative setting, the DM benefits from giving attention to a greater number of agents.
For the case whenk ≤ m, the DM prefers the contest mechanism that awardsk slots of attention.
For the case whenk > m, it is no longer clear that the DM will always prefer the optimal contest mechanism to all other mechanisms by which she may award the prize. To see this, consider the case where n is large,k = n − 1, m = 1, and agent signals about their true quality is not precise.
If the DM can award attention to k = 1 agents through a contest mechanism in which all agent compete, she will become fully informed about the true quality of the agent with the highest signal, and about the signals of the other n − 1 agents. She may, however, benefit from awarding attention tok − 1 of the agents randomly, then holding a contest for the remaining review slot among the two remaining agents. This will result in the DM becoming fully informed about the qualifications ofk agents, and learning the signal of the other agent. This improves her ability to identify and implement the first-best prize allocation.
No benefit from agent payments
When identifying the optimal contest mechanism, the analysis assumes that the DM benefits from agent payments. This makes sense if the agents are interest groups providing political contributions to a politician, or they are employees competing for the attention of their boss through on-the-job effort or billable hours. There are some setting, however, where this might not be the case. It is not clear, for example, that colleges receive a direct benefit from the numerous community service projects conducted by high school students in an attempt to gain an admissions officer's attention.
In more extreme situations, the contest may involve "burning money" in an effort to gain the DM's attention.
In the event that the DM does not directly benefit from the payments, she is indifferent between the payment-maximizing contest mechanism and any other full-information contest mechanism guaranteeing the first-best prize allocation. If the expenditures by the agents have a significant social value (e.g., community service hours by college applicants), then the payment maximizing mechanism may equal the socially optimal mechanism. If, however, expenditures by the agents provide no direct benefit (e.g., "burning money"), then the payment-maximizing contest will not be the socially optimal mechanism. Rather, overall welfare may be improved if the DM implements a feasible, full-information contest mechanism which results in lower payments (e.g., Lemma 4.2 describes the set of feasible symmetric full-information contest mechanisms).
Non-lexicographic preferences
We assume that the DM's preferences are lexicographic in prize recipient qualifications. She has secondary preferences for collecting payments, which allow for a preference ordering of multiple mechanisms which result in the same expected quality. In some situations, this assumption fits well. For example, firms and colleges may be primarily concerned with identifying the mostqualified applicants. This is less realistic in political settings where politicians rely on contributions from interest groups to fund reelection campaigns. In considering such settings, our analysis may be viewed as an assessment of the ideal politician setting, in which voters elect decision makers who always work to identify and implement the best policy.
Relaxing the assumption that the DM has lexicographic preferences for prize recipient quality changes the analysis only a little. The payment-maximizing, full-information contest mechanism is unchanged. In the symmetric game, this remains the optimal way for the DM to award the prize (resulting in maximum total payments equal to v, and guaranteeing the first-best prize allocation).
In the asymmetric game, however, we cannot always conclude that the DM prefers this mechanism to all other mechanisms for awarding the prize. We can only conclude that the DM prefers this mechanism to all other mechanisms that guarantee the first-best prize allocation. To see this, consider a situation where the DM must award a single prize to one of two agents, and where one of the agents has a much larger valuation than the other agent. When the DM cares enough about payments relative to quality, she may prefer to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to sell the item to the high value agent. Doing so reduces the expected prize recipient quality, but increases payments compared to the contest mechanism.
Policy Implications
Our results have immediate implications for campaign finance reform, and political lobbying.
Campaign finance reform
The analysis illustrates how payments made from special interest groups to politicians do not necessarily hurt constituents. If the politician awards access based on contributions, payments from interest groups may actually help the politician become better informed about her policy alternatives, compared to the case where payments do not exist.
The analysis shows that if the politician is able to allocate access through her optimal contest mechanism, then she is able to guarantee that the most-qualified agents receive prizes (e.g., that she funds the most-beneficial earmarks). The mechanism also maximizes expected payments form the interest groups to the politician, compared to any other mechanism that achieves the first-best prize allocation. In equilibrium, interest group payments equal their expected benefit from participating in the political process. In the payment-maximizing contest for attention, interest groups compete away all of their political rent, giving it to the politician.
When the DM chooses her ideal contest mechanism, she is able to fully capture the rent from all agents, and in equilibrium each agent earns an expected payoff of 0. The mechanism requires that agents are able to submit payments up to prize valuations, v i . Therefore, laws that impose limits on agent payments can render the payment-maximizing mechanism infeasible. Formally, consider a payment limit,c < v i for some i ∈ N . This implies that B i (q i ) >c for at least some i and q i . In this case, the payment-maximizing contest mechanism is no longer a feasible mechanism given that contributions cannot exceed the limit. The DM is limited to full-information contest mechanisms that involve payment functions that satisfy C i ∈ β n and C i (q i ) ≤c for all i and q i .
Such a mechanism continues to result in a fully-informed DM, who implements the first-best prize allocation in equilibrium. However, it does so without the agents fully competing away their rent in an effort to gain the DM's attention. A limit prevents the DM from maximizing agent payments, but does not prevent the DM from becoming fully informed about the first-best prize allocation.
A political contribution limit, therefore, results in higher equilibrium payoffs for interest groups, and lower payoffs for a politician. The politician is still able to award attention in such a way that she becomes fully-informed about her policy alternatives. Therefore, limits do not result in worse policy outcomes.
This final result, that contribution limits do not reduce the politician's ability to identify her preferred policy, is in contrast to earlier work showing that limits distort the politician's information (e.g., Cotton 2009). This is because in our framework a contribution limit causes the politician to adjust her method of awarding attention to account for the lower payments, and she can still become fully informed. 14 Cotton (2009) showed that taxing contributions may result in better policy outcomes than limiting contributions. In our framework, neither taxing nor limiting payments reduces the DM's ability to identify and award prizes to the most-qualified agents. The two policies will have different implications for interest group payoffs. Compared to the case of no-reform, a limit results in a lower payoff for the politician and a higher payoff for the interest groups. A tax, on the other hand, reduces politician payoffs, increases tax revenue, but will not reduce expected interst group payments or increase interest group utility.
15 See video of the event at http://www.cnsnews.com/node/51610. Common intuition suggests that this limited capacity to review projects must decrease a politician's ability to identify and implement the most-favorable policy. Our analysis shows how the opposite may actually be true. We show how a DM can allocate limited attention in such a way that she becomes informed about the quality of all alternatives, not only those she reviews directly. This is because she indirectly learns about quality by directly reviewing alternatives, and also by making inferences after observing the payments made by those competing for her attention (signaling). The result requires that it is not too easy to gain access to the DM. Proposition 7.1 shows that if the DM reviews too many agents before awarding prizes, then agents no longer have the same incentive to compete for attention, and the strict monotonicity of their equilibrium payment functions (which is required for full-revelation of quality) breaks down.
In our model, a politician who only reviews a single policy alternative before making a decision may be better informed about the ideal policy than a politician who reviews all-but-one of the alternatives. If m < n − 1, then this extreme result always holds in the context of our model.
Allowing for other types of uncertainty in the model may weaken this result. For example, the model assumes that the DM is only uninformed about agent quality, and that agents have no uncertainty about how the DM will perceive their quality upon review. If we allow for the DM to also be uncertain of agent policy preferences or for agents to only observe a noisy signal of their quality, then the DM cannot become fully informed about an agent's quality by observing its payment alone. As discussed in Section 7.2, this additional uncertainty may result in a less cause the DM to prefer to directly review additional agents, even if it reduces the DM's ability to make inferences about quality by observing payments. As long as this additional uncertainty is not too large, however, the DM benefits from giving attention to m or fewer agents rather than more than m agents. 16
Conclusion
We develop a framework in which a decision maker has limited capacity to review alternative choices before making a decision about which of the alternatives to implement. This may represent a politician choosing which policy reforms to pursue or which earmarks to request from the appropriations committee. It may represent firms choosing which applicants to hire, colleges choosing which applicants to grant admissions, or countless other settings in which a decision maker must award a limited number of "prizes."
The analysis shows that when the decision maker allocates her limited attention through a Contest for Attention, she will becomes informed about the qualifications of all agents, even those she does not review. In equilibrium, the decision maker (correctly) expects that agents that make high payments are higher quality than similar agents who make lower payments, and can fully infer agent quality from their payments. We show that a standard all-pay auction can result in a fully-informed decision maker. However, the decision maker prefers to allocate access through a handicapped version of the mechanism that fully adjusts agent payments to account for observable heterogeneity. Such a mechanism guarantees a fully-informed decision maker, and maximizes payments from the agents.
Our theoretical results have implications to the policy debate, which we discuss in Section 8.
First, they provide insight into the effects of campaign finance reform. Contribution limits benefit interest groups, hurt politicians, and do not necessarily effect the policy outcomes. Second, the results show who politician time constraints and inability to fully review each piece of legislation before voting may result in better -informed politicians and better policy choices.
Appendix
The proofs below approach the analysis from the perspective of mechanism design. Under a contest mechanism, agents choose payments conditional on their qualifications. The Revelation Principle implies that we can model this choice as agents announcing their qualifications (possibly dishonestly), and being assigned a payment amount given their announcment. We denote agent i's announcement of its type byq i . That is, Letq i ≡ C * i −1 (c i ). Equilibrium payment functions must be such that the agents preferq i = q i ; that is, agents must prefer to truthfully reveal their types in equilibrium. Proof to Lemma 3.1: First we establish that strict monotonicity of C * i means that the DM has correct beliefs about q i in equilibrium. Given that C * i is strictly monotonic, there exists a one-to-one mapping between agent i's qualifications q i and its payment c i = C * i (q i ). Furthermore, strict monotonicity implies that C * i is invertible; with C * i −1 (c i ) = q i . The DM will correctly infer that q i = C * i −1 (c i ) when she observes contribution c i , even if she does not give i attention. This is true for all i, and in equilibrium the DM is fully informed about all q. Next, we show that these correct beliefs guarantee the first best prize allocation. The requirement that the DM's prize allocation is sequentially rational given her beliefs about q means that she must award the prize to the agent she believes has the highest qualifications. In equilibrium these beliefs are correct, and the most-qualified agent receives the prize with probability 1. QED Proof to Lemma 4.1: Consider player i's choice of c i given that all other agents make payments according toC, and the DM expects that all agents make payments according toC. We first establish that i does not want to pay more thanC. If i pays c i ≥C(q i ) and wins attention, then the DM reviews i's quality and awards i the prize only if q i >C −1 (c j ) for all other j = i. Since all others contribute according toC, i receives the prize only if q j < q i for all other j. (Ties happen with probability 0 in equilibrium.) Thus, i expects payoff Ω(q i )v i − c i , from paying c i ≥C(q i ). The expression is strictly decreasing in c i . Thus, i prefers c i =C(q i ) to all larger c i . Next we show that i does not want to pay less thanC. If i pays c i ≤C(q i ), then i wins attention only if c i >C(q j ) for all other j. If i wins attention, then it is assured of winning the prize sinceC(q i ) ≥ c i >C(q j ).
Thus, i expects payoff Ω(C −1 (c i ))v i − c i , which according to the revelation principal we can rewrite as Ω(q i )v i −C(q i ) and allow i to chooseq i . Agent i prefers c i =C(q i ) if its expected payoff is increasing in all c i <C(q i ), or equivalently allq i < q i . We take the first derivative of i's expected payoff, then require that it is non negative for allq i < q i . That is,
which is always true givenC ∈ β n and β n is defined as the set of strictly increasing payment functions for which this condition holds. Thus, i prefersq i = q i to all lowerq i , and equivalently prefers c i =C(q i ) to all lower c i . Given that i also prefersC(q i ) to all higher c i , we conclude that i prefersC(q i ) to all alternative c i . For anyC ∈ β n , therefore, if all agents make payments according toC, and the DM awards the prize accordingly, then no agent has an incentive to deviate. C * i =C for all i is a contribution equilibrium of M s (C).
Finally, to establish thatC plus the DM's prize allocation decision constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the overall game, we must establish that the prize allocation is sequentially rational given the strategies of the agents. This follows immediately from the definition of M s (C) as the contest mechanism associated with the prize rule that is sequentially rational givenC. QED Proof to Lemma 4.2: First, we show that ifC / ∈ β n , then there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium of M s (C) which results in a fully informed DM. For the DM to be fully informed, the equilibrium strategy must be fully separating. This meansC cannot take on the same value for multiple q i ∈ Q. This means thatC must be strictly increasing or decreasing at all values of q i ∈ Q. It is straightforward to rule out the possibility thatC is decreasing for some q i . If it were, agents would always have an incentive to pay more thanC(q i ) at such values. There remains the possibility thatC is strictly increasing, but not included in β n . However, if this were the case, it would not be a feasible strategy for at least player n, eliminating the possibility of it being an equilibrium. Thus, ifC / ∈ β n , there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium in which the DM is guaranteed to become fully informed about all q i .
Second, we establish that the DM is fully informed and implements the first best allocation whenC ∈ β n . This follows immediately from the earlier lemmas, and the definition of β n as a set of strictly increasing functions. Lemma 4.1 showed that for allC ∈ β n , the equilibrium under mechanism M s (C) involves agents playingC, a strictly increasing function. Lemma 3.1 established that a strictly increasing equilibrium payment function guarantees that DM becomes fully informed about the qualifications of all agents and implements the first best prize allocation. QED Proof to Lemma 4.3: Lemma 4.2 shows that ifC / ∈ β n , then M s (C) cannot guarantee the first-best prize allocation. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that M * s ≡ M s (B n ) results in higher payments compared to all other mechanisms M s (C) whereC ∈ β n . Lemma 4.1 established that the contribution equilibrium under M s (C) involves all agents making payments according toC. Therefore, M * s maximizes payments if B n (q i ) ≥C(q i ) for all q i ∈ Q and allC ∈ β n . This is guaranteed by the definition of β n as the set of all strictly increasing payment functions such that C i (q i ) ≤ B n (q i ) for all q i . Integrating this inequality gives the condition that C i (q i ) ≤ B(q i ) for all q i and all C i ∈ β n . Substituting inC for C i into this inequality concludes the proof. QED Proof to Lemma 4.4: For all i ∈ N such that v i = v n : (1) B i = B n , from which follows (2) C * i = B i , and finally (3) EU i = 0 since these agents submit payments equal to their expected benefit. For all j ∈ N such that v j > v n : (1) B n (q j ) < B j (q j ) for all q j ∈ Q, from which follows (2) C * j (q j ) = B n (q j ) < B j (q j ), and finally (3) EU j > 0 since these agents submit payments less than their expected benefit. QED Proof to Proposition 4.5: (i) follows from the Lemmas 3.1 and 4.1. (ii) follows from Lemmas 4.1 through 4.4 and that v i = v j for all i, j ∈ N means that B i = B n for all agents. Therefore all agents pay their expected benefit to the DM. The DM prefers M * s to all other methods of awarding the prize, since it guarantees the first best prize allocation, and of all mechanisms that guarantee the first best allocation it maximizes payments. QED Proof to Lemma 5.1: The proof follows the same structure as the proof to Lemma 4.1 for the symmetric mechanism. Consider player i's choice of c i given that all other j ∈ N make payments according to C * j = B j , and the DM expects that all agents make payments according to B. We first establish that i does not want to pay more than B i . If i pays c i ≥ B i (q i ) and wins attention, then the DM reviews i's quality and awards i the prize only if q i >C −1 (c j ) for all other j = i. Since all others contribute according to B j and contest mechanism M * a includes score functions θ i (c i ) = B −1 i (c i ) for all i, i receives the prize only if q j < q i for all other j. (Ties happen with probability 0 in equilibrium.) Thus, i expects payoff Ω(q i )v i − c i , from paying c i ≥ B i (q i ). The expression is strictly decreasing in c i . Thus, i prefers c i = B i (q i ) to all larger c i .
Next we show that i does not want to pay less than B i . If i pays c i ≤ B i (q i ), then i wins attention only if θ i (c i ) > θ j (B j (q j )) = q j for all other j. If i wins attention, then it is assured of winning the prize since
which according to the revelation principal we can rewrite Ω(q i )v i − B i (q i ) and allow i to chooseq i . Agent i will prefer c i = B i (q i ) if its expected payoff is increasing in all c i < B i (q i ), or equivalently allq i < q i . We take the first derivative of i's expected payoff, then require that it is non negative for allq i < q i . That is, Ω (q i )v i ≥ B i (q i ) for allq i < q i , which is always true given B i (q i ) = Ω (q i )v i . Thus, i has no incentive to deviate fromq i = q i to any lowerq i , and equivalently is willing to pay c i = B i (q i ) rather than any lower c i .
Given that i also prefers B i (q i ) to all higher c i , we conclude that i has no incentive to deviate from paying B i (q i ). If all agents make payments according to their respective B i , and the DM awards the prize accordingly, then no agent has an incentive to deviate. C * i = B i for all i is a contribution equilibrium of M * a . Finally, to establish that C * i = B i for all i, plus the DM's prize allocation decision constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the overall game, we must establish that the prize allocation is sequentially rational given the strategies of the agents. This follows immediately from the definition of M * a as the contest mechanism associated with the prize rule that is sequentially rational given B. QED Proof to Lemma 5.2: For all i ∈ N , C * i = B i . That is, all agents submit payments equal to their expected benefit. Thus, EU i = 0. QED Proof to Proposition 5.3: (i) follows from the Lemmas 3.1 and 5.1. (ii) follows from Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2, and that each agent submits its maximum feasible payment in equilibrium. The DM prefers M * a to all other methods of awarding the prize, since it guarantees the first best prize allocation, and of all mechanisms that guarantee the first best allocation it maximizes payments. QED Proof to Lemma 6.1: Consider player i's choice of c i given that all other j ∈ N make payments according to C * j = B j , and the DM expects that all agents make payments according to B. Letq i ≡ B −1 i (c i ). We first establish that i does not prefer to pay more than B i . Unlike in the single prize case, there now exists the possibility that i receives a prize even if it does not win attention. This happens if the number of other agents with q j >q i is at least k (so i does not receive attention), but no more than m − 1 (so that the DM believes i has one of the m highest qualifications). This is possible whenever k < m. If fewer than k other agents have q j >q i , then i wins attention and receives a prize only if fewer than m other agents have q j > q i . To establish that i does not have an incentive to submit a higher payment than B i (q i ), we show that i's expected utility is lower when she announcesq i > q i than whenq i = q i . Givenq i ≥ q i , agent i's 
where the first line is the expected payoff involving i receiving attention, and the second line is the expected payoff involving i not winning attention while signaling one of the m highest qualifications minus the payment. We can substitute in for 
The right hand side (RHS) of this inequality is the probability that (n − 1 − y) agents have q j <q i . The left hand side (LHS) is the probability that (n − 1 − y) agents have q j <q i and that x of these agents have q j > q i . Therefore, the RHS is greater than the LHS. To see this, rewrite the RHS as Therefore, Eq. 9 simplifies to 0 ≤ n−1−y x=m−y (n − 1 − y)! (n − 1 − y − x)!x! F (q i ) n−1−y−x (F (q i ) − F (q i )) x , which, givenq i > q i , is clearly satisfied for all y ∈ {0, 1, ..., k − 1}. Therefore, i prefersq i = q i to all higher values. We still need to show that i does not want to pay less than B i . If i pays c i ≤ B i (q i ), then i receives a prize if and only if fewer than m other agents have q j >q i . Given that k ≤ m, this condition includes the possibility that fewer than k have q j >q i , in which case i wins attention then reveals even a higher q i . It also includes the possibility that the number of other agents with q j >q i is more than k − 1, but less than m, in which case i does not win attention, but still receives a prize. Therefore, i expects payoff is Ω m (q i )v i − B i (q i ). The remainder of the proof proceeds identically to the proof to Lemma 5.1, except for replacing Ω with Ω m . In equilibrium, C * i (q i ) = B i (q i ) = Ω m (q i )v i for all i ∈ N and q i ∈ Q.QED Proof to Lemma 6.2: Proceeds identically to Lemma 5.2, except for B being redefined, B i (q i ) = Ω m (q i )v i . QED Proof to Proposition 6.3: Proceeds identically to Prop. 5.3, except for B being redefined, B i (q i ) = Ω m (q i )v i . QED Proof to Corollary 6.4: Follows from Prop. 6.3. QED Proof to Proposition 7.1: To satisfy the condition of Lemma 3.1, it must be that C * i (q i ) > 0 for all i ∈ N and all q i ∈ Q. Consider player i's choice of c i given that all other j ∈ N make payments according to C * j , and the DM expects that all agents make payments according to C * , where C * j (q j ) > 0 for all j and all q j ∈ Q. We will rule out the possibility that C * i is strictly increasing in all q i ∈ Q; a contradiction. To do this, consider i's expected payoff from submitting a payment less than C * i (q i ), which is equivalent to announcingq i < q i under a truthfully revealing mechanism. Doing so results in i receiving a prize if fewer than m other agents have q j >q i , or if fewer than k others have q j >q i and fewer than m have q j > q i . Thus, i's expected utility is 
When agent i choosesq i = q i , this expression simplifies to 0. Therefore, for i to not have an incentive to deviate fromq i = q i to announce a lower type, allq i < q i must yield a non-positive payoff. The payoff, however, is strictly positive for allq i < q i when k > m. A contradiction. This eliminates the possibility that a feasible equilibrium payment function can be found satisfying the conditions in lemma 3.1 for a fully informed DM. QED
